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Abstract
Three closely-related polynomial-based group key pre-distribution schemes
have recently been proposed, aimed specifically at wireless sensor networks.
The schemes enable any subset of a predefined set of sensor nodes to establish
a shared secret key without any communications overhead. It is claimed that
these schemes are both secure and lightweight, i.e. making them particularly
appropriate for network scenarios where nodes have limited computational
and storage capabilities. Further papers have built on these schemes, e.g. to
propose secure routing protocols for wireless sensor networks. Unfortunately,
as we show in this paper, all three schemes are completely insecure; whilst
the details of their operation varies, they share common weaknesses. In two
cases we show that an attacker equipped with the information built into just
one sensor node can compute all possible group keys, including those for
which the attacked node is not a member; this breaks a fundamental design
objective. In the other case an attacker equipped with the information built
into at most two sensor nodes can compute all possible group keys. In the
latter case the attack can also be achieved by an attacker armed with the
information from a single node together with a single group key to which this
sensor node is not entitled. Repairing the schemes appears difficult, if not
impossible. The existence of major flaws is not surprising given the complete
absence of any rigorous proofs of security for the proposed schemes.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with the problem of enabling groups of nodes
(such as exist in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)) to establish shared
secret keys for use by any subset of the nodes, using only information dis-
tributed to the nodes in advance by a trustedKey Generation Centre (KGC).
In particular we examine three separate (albeit closely related) protocols de-
scribed as being designed for wireless sensor networks, although they have
no particular features restricting their operation to this use case. Indeed,
they would work just as effectively for any case where a number of hardware
tokens, such as RFID tags or smart cards, are to be distributed by a single
trusted party. The schemes we consider are designed to ensure that nodes
which are part of the system, but not part of a selected group, cannot access
the key for that group, i.e. nodes can only access keys for groups of which
they are a part.
All three of the schemes we consider are polynomial-based. They appear to
be inspired by the work of Blundo et al. [2]; however, unlike this prior art,
the schemes all have major flaws. Unfortunately, many other polynomial-
based group key distribution schemes have been shown to be flawed, [7, 9,
10, 11, 12], meaning that the approach needs to be used with care. In any
event, there are many existing schemes which achieve the same objectives
in an efficient way and which have rigorous proofs of security — see, for
example, Boyd et al. [3], and, of course, the previous work of Blundo et al.
[2].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Some preliminary
remarks are made in §2. The 2015 Harn-Hsu protocol is described in §3,
together with an attack against this scheme. The very closely-related 2015
Harn-Gong scheme is briefly considered in §4. A more recent scheme, the
2019 Albakri-Harn protocol, is described and analysed in §5. Other issues
are discussed in §6, and brief conclusions are provided in §7.
2 A preliminary observation
All three of the schemes we describe involve arithmetic computed in the
ring of integers ZN , where N is an ‘RSA modulus’ [13], i.e. N = pq for
two large prime numbers p and q. This means that addition and multipli-
cation are computed modulo N . For today’s RSA applications, p and q are
typically chosen to be of the order of 21024, and we make this assumption
throughout. This ensures that with today’s techniques and computing re-
sources, factoring N is infeasible (and this is necessary to ensure that the
RSA cryptosystem is secure).
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If p and q are of this size, then the probability that a random integer s
(1 ≤ s < n) is coprime to N = pq is very close to 1. To see this, observe
that φ(n), the Euler phi function that gives the number of positive integers
less than n that are coprime to n (Menezes et al. [8], Definition 2.100),
satisfies φ(pq) = (p − 1)(q − 1) for any primes p, q ([8], Fact 2.101). Thus
the probability that a random positive integer less than N = pq (where p
and q are of the order of 21024) is coprime to N is
φ(N)/N = (p − 1)(q − 1)/pq ≈ (22048 − 21025)/22048 = 1− 2−1023.
Hence we assume throughout that all randomly chosen integers are coprime
to N and so have multiplicative inverses modulo N ; moreover, such inverses
can readily be computed ([8], Algorithm 2.142). That is, we can readily
compute divisions modulo N , a fact that underlies all the attacks we de-
scribe.
3 The Harn-Hsu scheme
In 2015 Harn and Hsu [5] proposed a group key pre-distribution protocol for
WSNs. Unfortunately, as we describe in detail below, the Harn-Hsu scheme
is insecure. In particular, anyone with the shares belonging to one node
can compute the keys for all possible groups, regardless of membership.
The nature of the flaws giving rise to the attack are rather fundamental,
meaning that it is difficult to imagine how the scheme could be rescued.
3.1 The protocol
We next describe the Harn-Hsu protocol [5]. The protocol involves a set of ℓ
end nodes S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sℓ} and a Key Generation Centre (KGC). Note
that, in this description and in the description of related protocols (in §4
and §5), the terminology and notation have been changed slightly from that
used in the source papers to ensure consistency. As with all such protocols,
the Harn-Hsu protocol has two phases, as follows.
• Share generation, a pre-distribution phase in which the KGC gener-
ates a set of m− 1 shares {si,1(x), si,2(x), . . . , si,ℓ−1(x)} for each node
Si ∈ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, where each share si,j(x) is a polynomial. It is
assumed that the KGC distributes the shares to the nodes using a
secure channel, e.g. at the time of manufacture/personalisation, and
that each node stores its shares securely.
• Group key establishment, where all members of a subset of nodes inde-
pendently generate a group key for use by nodes in that subset. Note
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that, if repeated with the same subset of nodes, the key establishment
process will generate the same key, but a different key is generated for
each node subset.
We next describe the operation of these two phases in greater detail.
3.1.1 Share generation
The KGC first chooses an ‘RSA modulus’ N , i.e. N = pq where p and q are
two primes chosen to be sufficiently large to make factoring N infeasible.
It is also assumed that each node Si has a unique identifer IDi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ,
where 1 ≤ IDi < N . It is (presumably) the case that the KGC keeps p and q
secret, although, as we see below, this does not appear to make a significant
difference to the security of the scheme.
The KGC next chooses a polynomial f over ZN of degree k for some pre-
chosen k. We suppose that the polynomial coefficients are chosen uniformly
at random from ZN . No explicit guidance is given on the choice of k, but
later it is claimed that the scheme is secure if up to k nodes are captured
and their secrets are revealed. We assume throughout that k ≥ 2.
For every Si (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) the KGC calculates a set of ℓ − 1 shares in the
following way.
• The KGC first computes f(IDi).
• The KGC then chooses at random ℓ − 2 values ui,1, ui,2, . . . , ui,ℓ−2,
where 0 < ui,j < N for every j (1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 2).
• The KGC then computes ui,m−1 as
ui,m−1 =
f(IDi)∏ℓ−2
j=1 ui,j
mod N
i.e.
ℓ−1∏
j=1
ui,j ≡ f(IDi) (mod N).
• Finally, the shares for Si are computed as si,j(x) = ui,jf(x) mod N ,
1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ− 1, where each share is a polynomial over ZN of degree k.
Finally, the KGC equips each node Si ∈ S with the following:
• the shares {si,1(x), si,2(x), . . . , si,ℓ−1(x)};
• the values of N and the node’s own identifier IDi;
• the identifiers IDj of all of the other nodes.
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3.1.2 Group key establishment
Suppose some subset S ′ ⊆ S of sensors (|S ′| ≥ 2) wish to share a group key,
where |S ′| = h (2 ≤ h ≤ ℓ). The group key KS′ ∈ ZN for S
′ is defined to
be:
KS′ = f(0)
ℓ−h
∏
Sj∈S′
f(IDj) mod N.
Any node Si ∈ S
′ can computeKS′ using the shares {si,1(x), si,2(x), . . . , si,ℓ−1(x)}
in the following way.
• Suppose that
S ′ − {Si} = {Sr1 , Sr2 , . . . , Srh−1}
and that
S − S ′ − {Si} = {Srh , Srh+1 , . . . , Sr′ℓ−1}
• Then set
KS′ =
h−1∏
j=1
si,j(IDrj )
ℓ−1∏
j=h
si,j(0).
However, a node Sk 6∈ S
′ cannot use its shares to compute KS′ , at least not
in the way described above.
Finally note that it should be clear that the group key KS for the set of all
sensors is simply
KS =
ℓ∏
j=1
f(IDj) mod N.
3.2 Critical vulnerabilities
We describe below a simple insider attack which enables the discovery of all
the group keys. This can be achieved using the shares held by any one of the
nodes. The attack works regardless of the choice of the polynomial degree
k. We also show that, even without access to a set of shares, knowledge of
some keys enables others to be deduced.
3.2.1 Some simple deductions
We start with a simple but key observation where here, and in the remainder
of §3, we suppose that the values z1, z2, . . . , zℓ satisfy
f(IDr) ≡ zrf(0) (mod N)
and 0 ≤ zr < N for every r (1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ).
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Lemma 3.1 If si,j(x) is a share for user Si (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ − 1),
then, for any r (1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ):
zr = si,j(IDr)/si,j(0) mod N.
Proof By definition, we immediately have:
si,j(IDr)/si,j(0) ≡ ui,jf(IDr)/ui,jf(0) (mod N)
= f(IDr)/f(0).
The result follows immediately from the definition of zr.
We next have a related result.
Lemma 3.2 If S ′ ⊆ S is some non-empty subset of the nodes, then the key
KS′ for the group S
′ satisfies:
KS′ = f(0)
ℓ
∏
Sj∈S′
zj mod N.
Proof By definition (and using the notation established in §3.1.2) we have
KS′ = f(0)
ℓ−h
∏
Sj∈S′
f(IDj) mod N
where h = |S ′|. But we assumed that f(IDr) ≡ zrf(0) (mod N), and hence
KS′ = f(0)
ℓ−h
∏
Sj∈S′
zjf(0) mod N
and the result follows by re-arranging the products.
This immediately gives the following.
Corollary 3.3 The group key KS shared by all nodes satisfies
KS = f(0)
ℓ
ℓ∏
j=1
zj mod N.
We also have the following.
Corollary 3.4 Suppose S1 = S2 ∪ {Si} for some Si (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ). Then
KS1/KS2 ≡ zi (mod N).
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3.2.2 Completing the insider attack
First observe that, using Lemma 3.1, anyone possessing the shares belonging
to a single sensor node can learn the values of zr, 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ, for every r.
Next observe that, since a single set of shares enables recovery of the group
key KS shared by all nodes, the attacker can obtain f(0)
ℓ mod N since it
follows from Corollary 3.3 that:
f(0)ℓ =
KS∏ℓ
j=1 zj
mod N.
Given knowledge of f(0)ℓ mod N together with the complete set of values
z1, z2, . . . , zℓ, Lemma 3.2 enables the computation of any group key KS′ .
This completes the attack.
3.2.3 An outsider attack
Even if an attacker does not possess any of the shares, then attacks are still
possible if the attacker has access to some of the keys KS′ generated using
the system. We give a simple example of an attack, but many other variants
are possible.
Suppose an attack has access to three group keys: KS1 , KS2 and KS3 , for
groups S1, S2 and S3, where the attacker also knows the membership of these
groups. Suppose also (to make the discussion simpler) that S1 = S2 ∪ {Sy}
for some node Sy. Then, by Corollary 3.4, the attacker can immediately
compute zy.
If Sy ∈ S3, then the attacker can now compute KS4 = KS3/zr mod N , where
S4 = S3−{Sy}. That is, the attacker can compute another valid group key.
This attack works because there are simple algebraic relationships between
the keys.
4 The Harn-Gong scheme
In 2015, the same year in which the Harn-Hsu paper appeared, Harn and
Gong [4] presented another group key pre-distribution scheme. It would
appear that this paper was actually submitted a few months earlier than
the Harn-Hsu paper. However, we consider it after Harn-Hsu as the scheme
it describes is essentially just a special case of the Harn-Hsu scheme.
Like the Harn-Hsu scheme, a KGC distributes shares to each of a set of ℓ
nodes. The KGC first chooses an RSA modulus N and a polynomial f(x)
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over ZN of degree k for some pre-chosen k. The single share sent to each
user Si is computed as si(x) = uif(x) mod N . where ui satisfies
(ui)
ℓ−1 ≡ f(IDi) (mod N).
Using the notation of §3, it should be clear that this is simply a special
case of the Harn-Hsu scheme where the set of ℓ − 1 shares for a user are
all chosen to be equal, i.e. where ui,1 = ui,2 = . . . = ui,ℓ−1 and hence
si,1(x) = si,2(x) = . . . = si,ℓ−1(x). All other aspects of the scheme are
identical.
Since it is just a special case of the Harn-Hsu scheme, precisely the same
attacks work, and hence we do not consider the scheme further here.
5 The Albakri-Harn scheme
Four years after the Harn-Hsu paper appeared, in 2019 Albakri and Harn [1]
proposed yet another group key pre-distribution protocol for WSNs. Three
variants of the protocol are described, a basic scheme, which has a heavy
storage overhead, and two derived schemes which use the same underlying
idea but reduce the storage requirement for individual nodes. Given its
fundamental role, we focus here on the basic scheme.
At first sight the scheme is somewhat different to the two schemes we have
examined so far. However, more careful analysis reveals that it is again very
closely related. Not surprisingly, the Albakri-Harn scheme is also insecure.
In particular, if two nodes collude, or if one node gains access to a single
key to which it is not entitled, then all keys for all groups, regardless of
membership, can be computed.
5.1 The protocol
We describe the Basic scheme, [1]. The protocol involves a set of ℓ sensor
nodes S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sℓ} and the KGC. The protocol has two phases.
• Token generation, a pre-distribution phase in which the KGC generates
a token Ti for each node Si ∈ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. As previously, it is
assumed that the KGC distributes the tokens to the nodes using a
secure channel, e.g. at the time of manufacture/personalisation.
• Group key establishment, where all members of a subset of nodes in-
dependently generate a group key for use by nodes in that subset.
We next describe the operation of these two phases in greater detail.
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5.1.1 Token generation
Again as before, the KGC first chooses an ‘RSA modulus’ N , i.e. N = pq
where p and q are two primes chosen to be sufficiently large to make factoring
N infeasible. It is also assumed that each node Si has a unique identifer
IDi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, where 1 ≤ IDi < N .
The KGC next chooses a set of ℓ univariate polynomials F = {f1, f2, . . . , fℓ}
over ZN , each of degree t−1 for some t. In the absence of further information,
we suppose here the coefficients of these polynomials are chosen uniformly
at random from ZN . No explicit guidance is given on the choice of t, but
later it is claimed that the scheme is secure if up to t−1 nodes are captured
(and presumably their secrets are revealed), and that the choice of t is a
trade-off between the computational complexity of key establishment and
the security of the scheme. We assume throughout that t ≥ 2, since if
t = 1 all polynomials are of degree zero and all tokens (and group keys) are
identical.
For every i (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) the KGC calculates the token Ti as the following
polynomial in ℓ− 1 variables:
Ti = fi(IDi)
ℓ∏
j=1
j 6=i
fj(xj) mod N.
Finally, the KGC equips each node Si ∈ S with the following:
• the token Ti;
• the values of N and the node’s own identifier IDi;
• the identifiers IDj of all of the other nodes.
It is important to note that some of the steps above are based on the au-
thor’s interpretation of the Albakri-Harn paper, [1], as many details are left
unclear.
5.1.2 Group key establishment
Suppose some subset S ′ ⊆ S of sensors (|S ′| ≥ 2) wish to share a group key.
The group key KS′ ∈ ZN for S
′ is defined to be:
KS′ =
∏
Sj∈S′
fj(IDj)
∏
Sv∈S−S′
fv(0) mod N.
Any of the nodes Si ∈ S
′ can computeKS′ by evaluating the token Ti mod N
for a particular choice of the indeterminates xj, namely by setting
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xj =
{
IDj if Sj ∈ S
′
0 otherwise.
However, a node Sk 6∈ S
′ cannot use its token Tk to compute KS′ , at least
not in the way described above.
Finally note that it should be clear that the group key KS for the set of all
sensors is simply
KS =
ℓ∏
j=1
fj(IDj) mod N.
5.1.3 An observation
It was stated above that this scheme is closely related to the Harn-Hsu
scheme. This is not immediately apparent, as the Harn-Hsu scheme involves
a node being given a set of shares each of which is a univariate polynomial,
and in the Albakri-Harn scheme a sensor node is given a token consisting of a
single multivariate polynomial. However, this token is actually analogous to
the product of the Harn-Hsu shares, in the case where the share polynomials
have distinct indeterminates (although the polynomials fi in Albakri-Harn
are all distinct). Armed with this insight, the protocol then works in an
essentially identical way to Harn-Hsu. It is therefore not surprising that, as
we discuss below, closely analogous attacks apply.
5.2 An attack
5.2.1 Stage 1: Partial polynomial recovery
In the discussions below we need notation for the coefficients of the polyno-
mials in F , and hence, recalling that all these polynomials have degree t−1,
we suppose that
fi(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
fijx
j
for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
We first consider what a single node Si can learn about the polynomials in
F from a single token Ti. It follows immediately from the definition that Ti
consists of the sum of all terms of the form
fi(IDi)
ℓ∏
j=1
j 6=i
fjkjx
kj
j mod N,
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where 0 ≤ kj ≤ t− 1 for every j. That is, Si will know the value of
fi(IDi)
ℓ∏
j=1
j 6=i
fjkj mod N
for every pair (j, kj), where 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ (j 6= i) and 0 ≤ kj ≤ t− 1.
Given these observations, for any r (1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ, r 6= i) and any s (1 ≤ s), and
using the known coefficients of the polynomial Ti, it is simple to compute
the ratio of two such coefficients, namely
fi(IDi)
∏ℓ
j=1
j 6=i
fjkj
fi(IDi)
∏ℓ
j=1
j 6=i
fjk′j
mod N
where kj = k
′
j for every j except for j = r and kj = s, where we put k
′
r = 0.
In this case all the identical terms will cancel, and the above expression will
equal
frs
fr0
mod N.
That is, for every polynomial fr (r 6= i), the ratio of each coefficient in fr to
the constant coefficient fr0 can be computed. Hence Si can readily discover
the values w1, w2, . . . , wt−1 where
frj = wjfr0.
Moreover, given IDr (which is known to all nodes), Si can use the above to
deduce that
fr(IDr) = zrfr0
for some zr known to Si, for every r 6= i.
5.2.2 Stage 2: Pair-wise collusion to complete the attack
We next describe how, if two nodes collude, e.g. by sharing their tokens, they
can completely break the system; that is they will have the means to readily
compute every possible group key, including for groups excluding both of
them. That is, as is the case for all three schemes examined, the system is
completely insecure if just two nodes collude, regardless of the choice of t.
We first need the following simple result (analogous to Lemma 3.2), which
uses the notation of §5.1.
Lemma 5.1 Suppose the values z1, z2, . . . , zℓ satisfy
fr(IDr) ≡ zrfr0 (mod N)
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for every r (1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ). If S ′ ⊆ S is some non-empty subset of the nodes,
the key KS′ for the group S
′ satisfies:
KS′ =
∏
Sj∈S′
zj
ℓ∏
v=1
fv0 mod N.
Proof By definition we have
KS′ =
∏
Sj∈S′
fj(IDj)
∏
Sv∈S−S′
fv(0) mod N.
We assumed that fr(IDr) = zrfr0 mod N for every r, and it trivially holds
that fr(0) = fr0 for every r. Hence
KS′ =
∏
Sj∈S′
zjfj0
∏
Sv∈S−S′
fv0 mod N.
The result now follows by re-arranging the products.
The following corollary (analogous to Corollary 3.3) is immediate.
Corollary 5.2 The group key KS shared by all nodes satisfies
KS =
ℓ∏
j=1
zj
ℓ∏
v=1
fv0 mod N.
We now observe that, from the arguments in §5.2.1, if any two users col-
lude then they can learn the complete set of values z1, z2, . . . , zℓ satisfying
fr(IDr) = zrfr0 mod N , 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ.
Next observe that, since they can both readily compute the group key KS
shared by all nodes, they can obtain
∏ℓ
v=1 fv0 mod N since it follows from
Corollary 5.2 that:
ℓ∏
v=1
fv0 =
KS∏ℓ
j=1 zj
mod N.
Armed with knowledge of
∏ℓ
v=1 fv0 mod N together with the complete set of
values z1, z2, . . . , zℓ, the colluding nodes can use Lemma 5.1 to immediately
compute any group key KS′ , regardless of whether either of the colluding
nodes are members of the group S ′. This completes the attack.
12
5.2.3 An alternative to collusion
Just as previously, even in this case it remains possible to completely break
the system if a node (by some means) learns a single key for a group of
which the node is not a member. Suppose node Si knows the key KS′ for
the group S ′, where Si 6∈ S
′. By Lemma 5.1, Si knows that:
KS′ =
∏
Sj∈S′
zj
ℓ∏
v=1
fv0 mod N.
But Si knows all the values zj for Sj ∈ S
′, since Si 6∈ S
′. Hence Si can
compute
∏ℓ
v=1 fv0 mod N as
ℓ∏
v=1
fv0 =
KS′∏
Sj∈S′
zj
mod N.
Knowledge of
∏ℓ
v=1 fv0 mod N together with the (almost) complete set of
values z1, z2, . . . , zℓ (except for zi), enables Si to now compute any group
key KS′ for any group S
′ for which Si 6∈ S
′. This completes the attack.
5.3 A simplified attack
Using the same notation as before, we now present an even simpler version
of the attack approaches described in §5.2. This attack does not seek to
recover information about the polynomials in F , but instead recovers just
sufficient information to be able to recover all group keys. We use the
notation established in §5.2.
5.3.1 Learning a set of ratios
We start with another simple observation, analogous to Corollary 3.4.
Lemma 5.3 Suppose Si = S − Si. Then
KS/KSi = zi mod N
for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
Proof By Lemma 5.1,
KSi =
ℓ∏
j=1
j 6=i
zj
ℓ∏
v=1
fv0 mod N.
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Similarly, by Corollary 5.2,
KS =
ℓ∏
j=1
zj
ℓ∏
v=1
fv0 mod N.
The result follows immediately.
From Lemma 5.3, it follows that Si can learn the values of zr, 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ, for
every r 6= i.
5.3.2 Completing the attack
Armed with the values of zr, 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ, for every r 6= i, the attacks described
in §5.2.2 and §5.2.3 now work exactly as previously described.
6 Other observations
6.1 But what about the security analyses?
On the face of it, the above analyses are rather surprising in the light of
apparently robust claims made in the Harn-Hsu [5], Harn-Gong [4], and
Albakri-Harn [1] papers. In all three papers there are apparently ‘theorems’
proving the security of the respective schemes. However, in every case closer
examination reveals that the ‘proofs’ are not in any way rigorous arguments.
For example, Theorem 1 of Albakri and Harn [1] states that ‘The adversaries
cannot obtain any information of secret polynomials selected by KGC’. The
‘secret polynomials’ referred to here are the polynomials in F , and the set of
possible adversaries includes parties with knowledge of one or more tokens
Ti. However, we have shown in §5.2 that knowledge of a single token is
sufficient to learn all but one of the polynomials in F up to a constant term.
How can this be, given Theorem 1? Examination of the ‘proof’ of Theorem
1 reveals that it is by no means a rigorous proof — it is more a series of
unsubstantiated claims. For example, the proof starts with the following
statement ‘Capturing one sensor — It is obvious that by capturing any
single sensor Si, and obtaining the token Ti, the adversary cannot recover
information of any individual polynomial fi, nor the product of all individual
polynomials’. That is, the ‘proof’ of the main claim seems to amount to a
statement that it is ‘obvious’. Sadly, the claimed result is clearly not as
obvious as the authors hoped.
More seriously, this highlights the need for newly proposed cryptographic
protocols to be provided with robust and rigorous evidence of their security.
Indeed, this has been the state of the art for a couple of decades, as has
been very widely discussed — see, for example, Boyd et al. [3].
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6.2 Three almost identical schemes
Quite apart from the lack of security, it is unfortunate that, given all three
papers we considered ([1, 4, 5]) share one author, that three such similar
schemes have been published separately. Moreover, the authors make no
attempt to explain the close relationships between the three schemes.
6.3 An application
To make matters worse, some authors have sought to build broader security
schemes on top of one of the schemes considered here. For example, Harn
et al. [6] describe a secure routing protocol for WSNs, of which the Harn-
Hsu scheme [5] forms an integral part; indeed, for some reason the authors
have chosen to describe the Harn-Hsu scheme again in some detail. This, of
course, means that the routing protocol, regardless of its design, is inherently
insecure. It would, of course, have been good design practice to describe the
routing protocol in terms of a ‘black box’ technique for key pre-distribution,
and then to mention possible candidates for this black box, since there is no
inherent reason to couple the two techniques. This would have avoided the
main problem.
7 Summary and conclusions
As we have demonstrated, the Harn-Hsu, Harn-Gong and Albakri-Harn
schemes all possess fundamental flaws. Given the nature of these flaws,
it is difficult to imagine how the schemes could be rescued. Indeed, there is
no reason to believe that a secure scheme can be designed using the under-
lying approach adopted in all three cases. As observed in §1, many related
polynomial-based group key distribution schemes have been shown to be
flawed, [7, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Again as observed above, there are many existing
schemes which achieve the same objectives in an efficient way and which
have rigorous proofs of security — see, for example, Boyd et al. [3] and
Blundo et al. [2].
Fundamentally, the fact that the authors have not provided rigorous proofs
of security for the various schemes means that attacks such as those de-
scribed here remain possible. It would have been more prudent to follow
established wisdom and only publish a scheme of this type if a rigorous
security proof had been established. Similar remarks apply to the all-too-
often misconceived attempts to fix broken schemes, unless a proof of security
can be devised for a revised scheme. Achieving this seems very unlikely for
variants of the schemes we have examined.
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